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Abstract
For U.S. rms from 1988 to 2007, rms with stricter loan covenants had
higher rm-level default recovery rates. Covenants were stricter, moreover,
when set during downturns in the business cycle. This implies a negative de-
pendence of recovery rates on lagged macroeconomic conditions. That is, bank
loan contracts established in economic recessions have tight covenants, leading
later to higher recovery rates. My empirical evidence suggests that private
creditors have signicant inuence on rmsbankruptcy decisions through the
channel of covenants in debt contracts.
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I Introduction
As a common characteristic of debt contracts, covenants are generally perceived to
protect creditors against activities that transfer wealth from them to shareholders.
While theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that covenants are an important consid-
eration in nancial contracting, there are limited empirical studies that examine this
phenomenon. Consequently, a number of important questions remain unanswered:
Do covenants e¤ectively protect creditors? What is the magnitude of the economic
impact to creditors of including strict covenants in a debt contract? How do features
of nancial contracts, such as contract incompleteness, a¤ect creditors?
In this study, I attempt to answer these questions by exploring creditor recoveries
observed in bankruptcy cases. I present empirical evidence that the strictness of
loan covenants is a signicant determinant of default recovery rates. My estimates
suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in the measure of covenant strictness
is associated with an increase in expected default recovery rates of at least about
6% of principal, holding other explanatory variables constant. The dependence of
recovery rates on loan covenants induces lagged systematic variation in recovery
rates, because the strictness of bank loan covenants is counter-cyclical. So, not only
do creditorsrecovery rates respond to macroeconomic conditions at default, they
also covary with macroeconomic conditions at the inception of bank loan contracts.
Controlling for macroeconomic conditions at default, I nd that a one-standard-
deviation decrease in the measure of macroeconomic conditions at the origination
of a loan is associated with an increase in expected recovery rates of about 5% of
principal.
I focus on rm-wide default recovery rates, measured for each rm as the dollar-
weighted sum of ultimate dollar recoveries relative to total claims. I do this because
the default of one debt obligation often triggers cross-default contractual provisions
of all other debt of the same rm. Consequently, the binding loan covenants for all
of the debt of a rm are typically those of the loans with the strictest covenants.
Following Bradley and Roberts (2004), I construct a measure of the strictness
of bank loan covenants, a covenant-intensity index.This index is the sum of six
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covenant indicator variables: one each for collateral, dividend restrictions, asset sales
sweep, debt issuance sweep, equity issuance sweep, and the existence of more than
three nancial-ratio covenants. I also use alternative covenant strictness measures,
based on di¤erent indicator weights, for the purpose of robustness analysis.
In order to empirically investigate the e¤ect of loan covenants on default recov-
ery rates, I take three steps. First, I estimate a multivariate econometric model
relating recovery rates to lagged macroeconomic conditions. I nd signicant lagged
systematic variation in recovery rates. Second, I examine the counter-cyclicality of
covenant strictness by regressing the covenant-intensity index on various measures
of macroeconomic conditions, controlling for rm characteristics. My results pro-
vide empirical support for the presence of time-varying loan standards. Finally, I
establish a direct relationship between recovery rates and covenant strictness, con-
trolling for other determinants of recovery rates. I nd a positive and signicant
association, consistent with the hypothesis that stricter covenants help increase de-
fault recoveries. When the covenant-intensity index is included as a covariate, the
dependence of default recoveries on lagged macroeconomic conditions becomes in-
signicant, suggesting that lagged systematic variation in recovery rates is mainly
through the process of setting bank loan covenants.
This paper extends the existing empirical literature on nancial contracting.
In particular, my results provide the rst direct and quantitative evidence that
covenants in debt contracts protect creditors in the event of bankruptcy. More-
over, my estimates suggest that private creditors, through the channel of restrictive
covenants, have and often exert signicant inuence on rmsoperation decisions,
in particular on when to le for bankruptcy. Ultimate recovery rates are mainly
determined by two factors, namely the rm value at bankruptcy ling and costs
during the bankruptcy process. But even after controlling for factors that are most
likely to determine the post-ling deadweight loss, including the borrowers tangi-
ble assets, industry, and debt structure, my results show that strict covenants still
have a signicant positive impact on the total recovery to all creditors. This implies
that stricter covenants are likely to be associated with higher rm value at the time
of bankruptcy ling. This nding complements the existing empirical evidence that
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covenants inuence both rm investment policy [Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini,
Smith, and Su (2009)] and rm nancial policy [Roberts and Su (2009a) and Su
(2009)].
I also add to the empirical literature on the determinants of covenants in bond
and loan contracts. Due to data availability, most previous studies of debt covenants
have analyzed public debt issues, which have represented a minority of corporate debt
nancing.1 It has been documented that public debentures are more likely to include
covenants if issuers have smaller sizes, higher leverages [Malitz (1986)], less assets in
place, less operating cash ows [Begley (1994)], and more growth opportunities [Nash,
Netter, and Poulsen (2003)]. Bradley and Roberts (2004) examine commercial loan
covenants and nd that, in addition to the these e¤ects, macroeconomic factors, such
as indicators for recessionary periods and the prevailing credit spreads, are positively
related to the strictness of loan covenants. Demiroglu and James (2007) nd that
tighter covenants are associated with improvements in future performance and lower
borrowing costs. In this paper, I show that covenant strictness is also associated
positively with the lead banks leverage and negatively with the concentration of the
lending parties.
The empirical literature on recovery rates documents that market-wide average
default recovery in a given year depends positively on macroeconomic performance.2
Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) nd evidence of the presence of a re-sale
e¤ect on default recoveries, as proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Acharya,
Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) analyze the ultimate recovery rates of individual
securities rather than rm-wide default recoveries. Carey and Gordy (2007) nd
that the debt structure, in particular the bank-debt share in the total debt of a rm,
is a crucial determinant of rm recovery rates: The higher is the bank-debt share,
the more creditors tend to recover on average.
I go beyond the previous literature by showing that recovery is positively af-
fected by loan covenant strictness, and therefore by macroeconomic conditions at
1Houston and James (1996) estimate that the majority of rms borrow exclusively from banks
and private lenders, and that public debt accounts for only 17% of the total debt outstanding.
2See, for example, , Frye (2000a), Frye (2000b), Hu and Perraudin (2002), Pykhtin (2003),
Düllmann and Trapp (2004), and Altman, Brady, Resti, and Sironi (2005).
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loan origination, even after controlling for macroeconomic conditions at default, the
re-sale e¤ect, and bank-debt share. Moreover, I show that a more concentrated
bank-debt structure improves default recovery. This is consistent with the predic-
tion by Bris and Welch (2006) that lower coordination costs among multiple lenders
improve default recovery.
In summary, there is extensive prior research investigating the determinants of re-
covery rates and of debt covenants. This is the rst empirical study that links default
recoveries and covenant strictness. This is also the rst study that nds a connection
between default recovery and macroeconomic conditions at loan origination.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II states testable hy-
potheses regarding the impacts of covenant strictness and macroeconomic conditions
at loan origination on default recovery. Section III describes the data sources, mea-
sures of recovery rates and covenant strictness, and other determinants of recovery
rates and the strictness of loan covenants. Section III also provides summary statis-
tics for my sample and examines potential data selection biases. Section IV presents
empirical results on lagged systematic variation in recovery rates, time-varying loan
covenant strictness, and the role of state-contingent covenant strictness in deter-
mining systematic variation in recovery rates on current and lagged macroeconomic
conditions. Section V checks the robustness of some of the key results. Section VI
concludes.
II Testable Hypotheses
Of central interest is the question: Do bank loan covenants a¤ect recovery rates3
in the event of default, and if so, does this contribute to systematic variation of
recovery rates? The latter question arises because there is evidence that commercial
loan standards vary counter-cyclically. To answer this, I examine the determinants of
3I employ the recovery concept that species recovery rate as a fraction of the face value. Other
recovery concepts employed in the literature include the Recovery of Market Value,which denes
the recovery rate as a fraction of the pre-default market value, and the Recovery of Treasury,
which denes the recovery rate as a fraction of the present value of face. For a detailed discussion
on di¤erent denitions of recovery rates, see Bakshi, Madan, and Zhang (2006).
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rm-level default recovery rates. This section describes testable hypotheses regarding
the determinants of default recovery, particularly the lagged-covenant e¤ectthat
links macroeconomic conditions at loan origination with subsequent default recovery
through loan covenants.
The lagged-covenant e¤ect involves four hypotheses described in this section.
First of all, strict loan covenants preserve the liquidation value of the borrower,
and hence help improve default recovery. In general, after a debt contract is in place,
the borrower may have incentives to take advantage of the creditor, leading to such
agency problems as asset substitution and strategic default. This ex-post misalign-
ment of the interests of equityholders and creditors has been well documented and
studied in the corporate nance literature. Debt contracts, in particular bank-loan
contracts, therefore often include covenants that mitigate these problems in a num-
ber of ways [Drucker and Puri (2008)]. First, strict covenants help screen borrowers
ex-ante. Because covenants restrain the borrowers from detrimental actions, a rm
accepting strict covenant terms signals positive private information about its quality.
Second, covenants serve as a cheap monitoring device [Berlin and Loeys (1988)] and
provide incentives for the creditors to monitor [Rajan and Winton (1995)]. Finally,
strict covenants attribute more ex-post control rights to the creditors [Garleanu and
Zwiebel (2008)]. Upon violation of a covenant, also known as a technical default,
the creditors have the option to early terminate the loan before a severe deteriora-
tion in rm value, although the creditors often choose to renegotiate the contract
instead.4
In fact, covenants may impose various types of restrictions on the borrower. For
example, nancial-ratio covenants, such as covenants on interest coverage, xed-
charge coverage, leverage ratio, and net worth, require the borrower to remain nan-
cially healthy. Others, such as covenants on indebtedness, asset sales, and restricted
payments, restrict the borrower from destructive operations. All of these serve one
purpose: to preserve the asset value of the borrowing rm and hence to mitigate
the above-mentioned agency problems. Typically, the stricter are the covenants, the
4See, for example, Smith and Warner (1979), Smith (1993), Chen and Wei (1993), Beneish and
Press (1995), Chava and Roberts (2008), and Roberts and Su (2009b).
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better is the asset value preserved.5
Upon default, the rm value is divided among the creditors and the borrower.
A high liquidation value at default is expected to lead to a high recovery to the
creditors, holding other factors constant. This is intuitive in a Chapter 7 (liquidation)
bankruptcy. With a debt-restructuring, under Chapter 11 or out of court, creditors
may have more bargaining power when the alternative of liquidating the rm is
attractive, and hence may be able to extract higher default recovery. These e¤ects
are summarized in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Default recovery and covenant strictness) Default recovery rates
are positively associated with the covenant strictness of the loan contract in place at
default, controlling for other factors determining recovery rates.
The strictness of loan covenants depends not only on borrower-specic charac-
teristics, but also on bank lending standards. When drawing up a contract, it is
often impracticable for the banks to specify all the relevant contingencies and main-
tain a lending standard invariant to uctuations in macroeconomic conditions. In
good times, banks expand their lending activities. Arguably, this may induce lax-
ity in bank lending standards. In contrast, during credit-tightening periods, banks
tend to limit their credit risk exposure by tightening loan standards. A large body
of literature on banking and nancial intermediation is dedicated to investigating
this ight-to-qualityphenomenon.6 All else equal, covenants are stricter for loans
originating in economic downturns than in booms.
Hypothesis 2 (Counter-cyclicality of covenant strictness) The strictness of
bank loan covenants is negatively related to macroeconomic conditions when the loan
originates. That is, loan covenants are strict in economic contractions and loose in
expansions.
5Nini, Smith, and Su(2009) empirically nd that rms obtaining contracts with a new covenant
restriction have subsequent increasing market value and improving operating performance.
6See, among others, Rajan (1994), Lang and Nakamura (1995), Weinberg (1995), Asea and
Blomberg (1998), Lown, Morgan, and Rohatgi (2000), Ruckes (2004), OKeefe, Olin, and Richard-
son (2005), DellAriccia and Marquez (2006), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Guner (2007),
and Gorton and He (2008).
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Combining the e¤ects in Hypotheses 1 and 2, we identify a link between macro-
economic performance at loan origination and recovery in a subsequent default:
Hypothesis 3 (Lagged systematic variation in default recovery) All else equal,
default recovery rates are negatively associated with lagged macroeconomic conditions,
those prevailing at loan origination.
If the dependence of recovery rates on macroeconomic conditions at the time of
loan origination is indeed induced through the proposed covenant channel, variation
in recovery rates explained by macro factors should be fully explained by the covenant
strictness. The remaining task is to directly examine whether variation in default
recovery associated with previous macroeconomic conditions vanishes once we control
for the strictness of loan covenants.
Hypothesis 4 (The channel of setting loan covenants) Controlling for the strict-
ness of loan covenants, the dependence of default recovery rates on lagged macroeco-
nomic conditions is insignicant.
III Data and Explanatory Variables
This section describes the construction of my dataset.
A Data sources and sample selection
The sample of recovery rates is a March 2008 extract of the Ultimate Recovery
Database (URD) of Moodys, covering the period from April 1987 to July 2007.7 In
addition to security-level ultimate recovery rates for each default event, the URD
also provides detailed descriptive information on each defaulted security of the rm,
such as the instrument type, the principal amount outstanding at default, and its
relative ranking in the companys debt structure. I manually collect detailed rm-by-
rm information on loan covenants from SEC lings provided by the Electronic Data
7The ultimate recovery rate for a defaulted security is the eventual repayment to holders of this
defaulted security, as a fraction of principals.
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Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. Where possible, I complement
information on loan covenants from LexisNexis Academics and Laser Disclosure disks
from Thomson Financial.
I manually merge the recovery data with rm accounting information from COM-
PUSTAT, complemented when possible by SEC lings. To measure macroeconomic
performance, I use the trailing 12-month U.S. GDP growth rate from U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, the trailing 12-month aggregate default rate of speculative-grade
corporate bonds fromMoodys, the current yield spread betweenMoodys BAA-rated
and AAA-rated corporate bonds from Bloomberg, and the trailing 12-month return
of the S&P 500 Composite Index.
For the years from 1987 to 2007, the URD contains 741 rm-default events with
3,678 defaulted securities. I exclude all rms with no bank credit facility in place at
default. I then eliminate all rms whose SEC lings are not available in EDGAR,
LexisNexis Academics, or Laser Disclosure disks. This yields a nal sample of 422
rms with 2,071 defaulted securities from 1988 to 2007. This severe reduction of the
sample size is mainly due to my focus on rms with bank debt and the di¢ culty
in identifying loan contracts for many of the default events8 before 1994. I examine
potential selection biases at the end of this section.
B Measure of default recovery: Ultimate recovery rate
Two measures of default recoveries are provided in the URD: trading-price ultimate
recovery rates and settlement ultimate recovery rates. For each measure, the URD
provides both nominal and discounted recoveries. The discounted recovery rates are
the nominal recovery rates discounted at the corresponding interest rate of that debt
instrument, from the date on which the nominal recovery is received back to the last
date before default that a cash payment of interest or principal was made.
8Out of the 319 rms excluded from the original sample in the URD, 128 do not have a bank
credit facility at default. This large fraction of rms nancing only through public debt is consistent
with the empirical evidence in Cantillo and Wright (2000) that rms are more likely to issue either
public or private debt, rather than a mixture of the two. Bank credit contracts cannot be identied
for the rest 191 rms due to lack of SEC ling records.
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Consider a defaulted security with a par value of V0 and a continuously com-
pounding yield of r. Suppose that holders of the security are repaid with n securities
or assets with respective market values of p1; : : : ; pn at settlement. By denition, the
nominal and discounted settlement recovery rates are
RRNTP =
1
V0
nX
i=1
pi
and
RRDTP = e
 rTRRNTP ,
respectively, where T is the time from the last interest payment before default to
settlement.
If, however, the market values of these assets are not readily available at settle-
ment but instead are known later when they are liquidated, the recovery is measured
by the nominal and discounted trading price recovery rates, dened by
RRNS =
1
V0
nX
i=1
qi
and
RRDS = e
 rTRRNS,
respectively. Here, qi is the liquidation value of security i, realized when the actual
transaction takes place, which may be years after default settlement.
The recommended ultimate recovery rate(RUR), also provided in the URD, is
either the settlement recovery rate or the trading price recovery rate. If a package
of settlement instruments is received for the defaulted instrument and if their fair
market prices are available, the RUR is dened to be the settlement recovery rate.
Alternatively, in some cases such as liquidations, the fair value of the recovery package
may not be accurately measured at settlement, and may not be known or estimated
until an actual transaction takes place later. The RUR is dened to be the trading
price recovery rates in such cases.
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I focus on rm-wide ultimate recovery rates, a par-value-weighted average of the
recommended instrumental recovery rates dened for rm i as
RRi =
kP
j=1
V ij0 RRij
kP
j=1
V ij0
;
where RRij and V
ij
0 are the recommended ultimate recovery rate and the par value
of the j-th defaulted instrument, respectively.
C Covenant-intensity index
Following Bradley and Roberts (2004), I construct a measure of the strictness of bank
loan covenants, a covenant-intensity index.This index is the sum of six covenant-
indicator variables: one each for collateral, dividend restrictions, asset sales sweep,9
debt issuance sweep, equity issuance sweep, and the existence of more than three
(rather than two as in Bradley and Roberts (2004)) nancial-ratio covenants. Each
indicator is 1 if the corresponding covenant is included in the loan contract and 0
otherwise. I also use alternative covenant strictness measures, based on di¤erent
indicator weights, for the purpose of robustness analysis.
Some rms have more than one credit agreement in force at the same time. In such
cases, the e¤ectively binding covenant level is typically determined by the strictest
loan contract. In order to study the e¤ects of loan contract terms on default recovery
rates, one should ideally rst determine which are the covenants that the defaulted
rm has violated, if any. The corresponding contract is likely to be the e¤ective
determinant of bankruptcy. Because rms are not required to report precisely what
triggered a bankruptcy ling, it is di¢ cult to identify the binding contract.
Fortunately, most U.S. rms borrow from only one bank or one syndicate of
banks. In my sample, 364 of the 422 rms borrowed under one credit agreement.
9A sweepcovenant mandates early retirement of a loan conditional on a specied event, such
as a security issuance or asset sale.
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For these rms, the current credit agreement is therefore the binding contract. For
the remaining 58 rms, I instead examine all coexisting loan contracts for the rm and
identify the contract with the highest covenant-intensity index, taking this contract
as a proxy for the binding contract. As a robustness check, I exclude rms with
multiple credit agreements at default. The results are consistent with results for the
entire sample of rms. This nding is discussed in more detail in Section V.
D Independent variables
This section introduces independent variables used in my empirical analyses of re-
covery rates and loan covenant strictness.
D.1 Determinants of recovery rates
In my empirical analysis of the lagged-covenant e¤ect, I control for other deter-
minants of recovery rates. My choice of control variables is motivated by existing
empirical and theoretical studies of corporate default recoveries.
Macroeconomic conditions at default. Macroeconomic conditions at default
have signicant impacts on recovery rates. Two e¤ects are at work. The economic-
downturn e¤ect is that default recoveries are low in bad times because the valuations
of rmsassets are on average low. The re-sale e¤ect, suggested by Shleifer and
Vishny (1992), is that default recoveries for rms in a distressed industry tend to be
low because the assets of these rms are mainly of use to peer rms, who typically
have a low demand for capacity-increasing assets at such times.
I measure macroeconomic conditions with four variables: the trailing 12-month
U.S. GDP growth rate from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the trailing 12-
month aggregate default rate of speculative-grade corporate bonds from Moodys,
the current yield spread between Moodys BAA-rated and AAA-rated corporate
bonds from Bloomberg, and the trailing 12-month S&P 500 Composite Index return
from CRSP. One predicts a positive impact of macroeconomic conditions at default
on recovery rates.
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Bank-debt share in total debt. Private debt, in particular bank debt, di¤ers
from public debt in many respects. As nancial intermediaries, banks are considered
to have informational and coordination advantages over dispersed public bondhold-
ers. Specically, prior theoretical research often assumes that, relative to public bond
investors, banks can assess private information at lower cost, monitor more e¢ ciently,
and are better at coordinating with each other and with the borrower during rene-
gotiation, reorganization, and liquidation.10 Motivated by these advantages of bank
debt, Carey and Gordy (2007) provide a theoretical model predicting that a higher
bank-debt share in total debt implies a higher optimal rm value at default, which
leads to higher default recovery rates. They nd empirical evidence that bank-debt
share is positively related with recovery rates.
Bank debt share is measured by the total principal amount of bank debt at default
as a fraction of total principal amount of all defaulted debt.11 I control for each rms
bank-debt share in estimating models of default recovery rates. I anticipate positive
impacts of bank-debt share on recovery rates.
Bank-debt concentration. Coordination among creditors plays an important role
in determining the speed, cost, and nal outcome of the reorganization process.
Based on the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, no material changes to the indenture
terms of public debt can be made without the unanimous consent of each and every
debtholder. This usually makes restructurings of public debt extremely costly. A
feasible alternative is an exchange o¤er, which, however, has holdout problems.12
Coordination failure can in some cases actually benet creditors, as it may provide
them with stronger bargaining power. In order to succeed in a restructuring, a
rm must o¤er high enough recovery to lead a su¢ cient number of dispersed public
debtholders to tender. Private lenders including banks are not subject to the Trust
10See Leland and Pyle (1977), Campbell and Kracaw (1977), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984),
Boyd and Prescott (1986), and Bris and Welch (2006), among others.
11Bank debt here refers to all private debt from both banks and non-bank nancial institutions.
Out of the 422 rms in the nal sample, 29 rms borrow from non-bank nancial institutions. My
estimates, however, are qualitatively una¤ected if we exclude these rms.
12See, for example, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) and Kahan and Tuckman (1993).
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Indenture Act of 1939, making it less expensive for them to renegotiate the terms of
loan contracts or to restructure their debt contracts. The participation of banks is
thus important to the success of an exchange o¤er.13
For Chapter 11 bankruptcy, as opposed to restructuring out of court, the consent
of public debtholders may be overridden by the court. Under Chapter 11, a reor-
ganization plan places creditors holding similarly prioritized debt claims (according
to security and subordination) into the same class. Creditors whose legal rights are
altered by the plan may vote on the plan.14 If a class votes against the plan, the court
may still approve the plan (a cram-down) if the court nds that the plan is fair
and equitable,which in practice usually means voting approval by higher-priority
classes. Hence, the bargaining power of creditors is reduced under Chapter 11 com-
pared to an out-of-court restructuring. In order to collect their recoveries, creditors
might incur costs. Bris and Welch (2006) argue that dispersed public debtholders
su¤er from a free-rider problem, being reluctant to exert e¤ort to collect on claims.
As a result, they fare worse than concentrated bank creditors. Bris and Welch (2006)
predict that a higher concentration of bank debt improves recovery rates.
In my empirical analysis, bank-debt concentration is measured by the Herndahl-
Hirschman (HH) index of the nominal amounts of bank debt instruments of the rm,
across di¤erent lenders, dened by
HHI i =
P
j L
2
ijP
j Lij
2 ; (1)
where Lij is the face value at o¤ering of the j-th loan of rm i. The HH index is one if
there is a single bank loan in the capital structure, and is near zero with many lenders
holding similar face values. Following Bris and Welch (2006), I expect a positive
association between recovery rates and the HH index of bank-debt concentration.
13See James (1996), for example.
14Section 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code denes acceptance of a plan by a class of claim holders
as such plan being accepted by creditors. . . that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than
one-half in number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors.
14
Leverage. Suppose that a rm defaults at time T and that the most recent con-
tractual covenant-monitoring date before default is S. The rms value at default is
likely to depend on the companys leverage at time S. As an alternative to lever-
age, distance to default, inspired by the models of Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1974), is a volatility-adjusted measure of how far a company is from some
notion of a default boundary.15 A small distance to default means that the company
is close to default, and when the rm defaults one period later, the rm value may
be deteriorated so much that it is far below the level of rm value that can trigger
a default. We expect a negative association with leverage and a positive association
between recovery rates and distance to default.
I examine the relationship between recovery rates and the rms debt-to-assets
ratio and distance to default, measured one quarter before the company defaults.
Distance to default is obtained by solving the Merton (1974) model for each rm,
following the algorithm of Du¢ e, Saita, and Wang (2007).16
Out-of-court versus in-court reorganizations. The two major forms of debt
restructuring are out-of-court exchange o¤ers and in-court Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In
an out-of-court restructuring, creditors hold extra bargaining power stemming from
regulations such as the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. In order to get enough tendering
creditors to allow for a successful o¤er, the rm may need to o¤er creditors better
terms than they would receive in a bankruptcy, implying higher predicted recovery
rates.
In contrast, a rm may have more control with an in-court (Chapter 11) bank-
ruptcy. Once a rm les under Chapter 11, all of its debt becomes due, but an
automatic stay is invoked, stopping essentially all principal and interest payments.
Secured creditors typically lose the right to take possession of their collateral. Under
Chapter 11, the control of a rm, through the debtor in possession (DIP) provisions,
typically remains with the current management and board of directors. Moreover,
15See, for example, Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Du¢ e, Saita, and Wang (2007).
16Bharath and Shumway (2008) show that, at least for default prediction, the details of the
construction of distance to default are not especially important.
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according to Section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code, the DIP has the exclusive right
to propose a plan for the rst 120 days after ling the bankruptcy petition. This
exclusivity period can be, and often is, extended by the court for lengthy periods.
Only after exclusivity is lifted may creditors propose a plan. Finally, as previously
discussed, the bargaining power of creditors is also reduced by Chapter 11 voting
rules.
Therefore, rm-wide recovery rates in distressed-exchange cases (of which there
are 83 in the sample studied in this paper) are expected to be higher than those in
formal Chapter-11 reorganizations.
In my empirical study, the form of reorganization is represented by an indicator
variable, Distressed Exchange, which is set to 1 if the default event is an out-of-court
distressed exchange and 0 otherwise.
D.2 Determinants of loan covenant strictness
I control for other determinants of loan covenant strictness in my empirical test of
the counter-cyclicality prediction. As a loan contract typically results from negotia-
tions between the borrower and the lender, the control variables of both parties are
relevant.
Borrower debt-to-assets ratio. Firms with a high debt-to-assets ratio have
high exposure to default risk and hence are more likely to have strict covenants in
their debt. This prediction nds support in prior empirical evidence on the covenants
of both public bonds and bank loans.17
A borrowers debt-to-assets ratio is measured by the ratio of total debt to to-
tal book assets. Consistent with previous studies, I expect a negative association
between a borrowers debt-to-assets ratio and covenant-intensity index.
Bank-debt share in total debt. A high bank-debt share in total debt suggests
strong dependence of the borrowing rm on bank nancing, which may strengthen
17See, for example, Malitz (1986), Begley (1994), Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2003), Bradley and
Roberts (2004), and Demiroglu and James (2007).
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the control and bargaining power of the bank. For example, empirical evidence
from Houston and James (1996) suggests that the management decisions of a rm
borrowing from a single bank are strongly inuenced by that bank. Carey and Gordy
(2007) suggest that the positive relation between recovery rates and bank-debt share
comes from the high bankruptcy thresholds set by banks for borrowers with more
bank debt. In summary, it is reasonable to hypothesize a positive impact of bank-
debt share on loan covenant strictness.
Syndicated loans. Syndicated-loan nancing for non-nancial U.S. corporations
has experienced strong growth in the past two decades, increasing from $137 million
in 1987 to $1.5 trillion in 2005. In my nal sample, 81% of the 422 rms borrowed
under syndicated credit facilities. In contrast with a loan from a single lender, a syn-
dicated loan is underwritten and nanced by a group of banks, insurance companies,
and other nancing institutions. The lead agentacts as an intermediary between
the borrowing rm and other lenders. The lead agent negotiates the terms of the
contract with the rm and monitors the rms performance. Participant lenders
are largely left out of these processes. As information asymmetry and creditor mon-
itoring play an important role in determining the restrictiveness of loan contracts,
one expects more restrictive loan covenants for syndicated loans than for bilateral
loans.18
In my empirical analysis, I use an indicator variable, Syndicated Loan, set to 1 if
the most restrictive loan is syndicated, and 0 otherwise. A positive relation between
Syndicated Loan and the covenant-intensity index is expected.
Bank liabilities-to-assets ratio. Due to information asymmetry between bor-
rowers and banks, loan covenants can serve as a screening device at loan origination.
That is, good rms signal their high quality by accepting strict loan covenants, as it is
costly for bad rms that are close to covenant violation to mimic. Hence unobserved
rm quality is expected to be positively related to covenant strictness.
18Bradley and Roberts (2004) nd that large lending syndicates incorporate more covenants into
their debt contracts.
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Banks are subject to risk-based capital adequacy requirements, which demand
higher marginal capital for loans to riskier borrowers than to less risky borrowers.
In choosing their portfolios, banks trade o¤ loan interests and risk-dependent capital
requirements. For example, if a bank is well-capitalized, its lending costs associated
with additional marginal capital requirements are low, implying that the bank may
prefer risky but highly protable loans to risky borrowers.19
Bank leverage is measured by the ratio of a banks total liabilities to the un-
weighted sum of its total assets.20 A high liabilities-to-assets ratio indicates an
under-capitalized bank, which may be inclined to lend to safe borrowers that accept
strict loan covenants. One expects a positive relation between covenant strictness
and bank liabilities-to-assets ratio.
For syndicated loans, I use the lead agents bank leverage, because the terms of
the contract are negotiated between the borrowing rm and the lead agent.
E Summary statistics
Table 1 shows some summary statistics of the nal sample (Panel A) and of the full
URD sample (Panel B). For the nal sample, the average recovery rate is 56%, with
a standard deviation of 27%. The total amount of debt outstanding at default ranges
across rms from $14.5 million to $23.4 billion, with a mean of $831.9 million and
a median of $319.5 million. This sample is skewed by the presence of many small
rms. At the median, a rm in the sample has 4 di¤erent debt instruments, with a
maximum of 80 debt instruments for US Airways, Inc. The distribution of the bank-
debt share has a mean of 44% and a median of 41%. The cross-sectional distribution
of the bank-debt concentration (the HH index dened by (1)) has signicant mass at
1, consistent with the presence of many rms borrowing under one credit agreement.
19This relates to the literature on the bank capital channel, i.e., the e¤ect of bank capital on
bank lending behavior. For detailed discussions, see Haubrich and Wachtel (1993), Grenadier and
Hall (1996), Furne (2001), Van den Heuvel (2002), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Bolton and
Freixas (2006), and Van den Heuvel (2007).
20In the Bank Regulatory database, bank liabilities are given by variable RCFD2950, and bank
unweighted total assets are given by variable RCFD2170.
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The average time in bankruptcy is around one year. The summary statistics for the
full URD sample of 722 rms are similar to those of the nal sample. Of the rms
in the URD, 84% had at least one bank loan.
In order to investigate potential sample-selection bias, Appendix A compares my
nal sample and the full URD sample with a broader sample of default events. My
nal sample, relative to the larger comparison sample, focuses more on recent (post-
1994) default events, includes some small rms not covered by Moodys, and excludes
rms in three highly regulated industries, namely Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing;
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; and Public Administration.
IV Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results. The lagged-covenant e¤ect is tested in
three steps. First, I examine whether there is systematic variation in recovery rates
with lagged macroeconomic conditions. Second, I investigate the counter-cyclicality
of the strictness of loan covenants. Finally, I directly compare the dependence of
recovery rates on lagged macroeconomic conditions before and after controlling for
the strictness of loan covenants.
A Descriptive evidence
I rst show some evidence from a selection of summary statistics.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the rms in the nal sample, grouped by
the covenant-intensity index (Panel A) and by inclusion of each of the six covenants
(Panel B). The rst row in Panel A illustrates that average recovery rates increase
as the covenant-intensity index increases, supporting Hypothesis 1.21 Moreover, de-
faulted rms with fewer covenants appear to spend more time in bankruptcy than
21For the 128 rms with no bank debt in the URD sample, the average rm-level recovery rate
is 39.1%, signicantly lower than the average recovery rate of 55.5% for the remaining rms with
bank debt in the URD sample. The t-statistic is 5.7 for the t-test comparing the group means. This
is consistent with Hypothesis 1 as there are no loan covenants for these 128 rms, although this
e¤ect is likely related also to their zero bank-debt shares.
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do rms with more covenants. The statistics shown in Panel B suggest that the in-
clusion of a covenant may help improve recovery rates. Moreover, loan covenants are
more frequently included for rms with more debt and higher debt-to-assets ratios.
Finally, rms with a restrictive covenant included in their loan contracts tend to
spend less time in the restructuring process and more time between the origination
of the loan and default.
B Lagged macroeconomic conditions as determinants of re-
covery rates
Hypothesis 3, formulated in Section II, states that bad macroeconomic conditions at
loan origination are expected to be associated with high recovery rates at subsequent
defaults, controlling for other e¤ects. I test this hypothesis with multivariate OLS
and two-sided Tobit regression models of recovery rates, controlling for other factors
that may a¤ect recovery rates, such as rm characteristics, macroeconomic conditions
at default, bank-debt share, and bank-debt concentration.22
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions of rm-wide recovery
rates on lagged macroeconomic variables, controlling for rm characteristics and
other determinants of default recoveries, using models of the form
RecoveryRateit = + 1 ln (TotalBookAssetsit) (2)
+2Debt-to-Assetsi(t 1) + 3BankShareit
+4HHI it + 5DistressedExchangeit
+6MacroFactort + 7MacroFactor + "it,
22My recovery data sample follows a data structure called pooled cross sections over time. That
is, during each year a new random sample of defaulted rms adds to my recovery database. It
is important not to confuse my sample data structure with panel data, where we follow the same
group of rms over time. Methods for pure cross section analysis, such as OLS, Tobit, Probit, and
Poisson regressions, can all be applied to pooled cross sections. However, for pooled cross sections,
year (or other time periods) dummies are usually included to account for aggregate changes over
time. (For a more detailed discussion on pooled cross sections, see Wooldridge (2002), Chapter
6.3.1.) In my empirical analyses, instead of using year dummies, I use macroeconomic variables to
control for aggregate changes over time.
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where t is the quarter of default, (t  1) is one quarter before default,  is the
origination date of the credit agreement before default, and "it is the error term.
Columns 1 to 4 in Panel A of Table 4 show that Lagged GDP Growth and Lagged
S&P 500 Return are both negatively and statistically signicantly related to rm-
level recovery rates (at standard test levels of signicance). The relationship between
recovery rates with Lagged Default Rate and Lagged Bond Spread are both positive
and statistically signicant. As to the magnitude of the lagged systematic varia-
tion, my estimates suggest that a one-standard-deviation decrease in the measure
of macroeconomic conditions at the origination of a loan is associated with an in-
crease in expected default recovery rates of about 5% of principal, holding other
explanatory variables constant. In estimating these e¤ects, I have controlled for rm
characteristics and other determinants of recovery rates, such as the total book as-
sets, debt-to-assets ratio, bank-debt share in total debt, concentration of the amounts
of lending to the given rm among the various banks o¤ering loans to that rm, and
the form of reorganization at default, whether out-of-court restructuring or ling for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11. These results are at least consistent with the hypoth-
esis that bad macroeconomic performance at loan origination results in high recovery
rates in subsequent defaults.
In addition, the estimates in Panel A of Table 4 suggest that rms with a higher
fraction of bank debt tend to have higher recovery rates. A one-standard-deviation
(28%) increase in bank-debt share, controlling for other variables, is estimated to
increase recovery rate by 7% of total principal. This is consistent with the nding
by Carey and Gordy (2007) that banks set higher bankruptcy thresholds for rms
with more bank-debt share in order to improve recovery rates.
I also nd a positive and statistically signicant relationship between bank-debt
concentration and recovery rates, consistent with the prediction of Bris and Welch
(2006) that a more concentrated debt structure improves default recovery. For illus-
tration, controlling for other e¤ects, a rm whose debt is all to one bank is predicted
to have 12% higher recovery than that of a rm who has equally-sized loans to each
of three banks.
I nd that the form of reorganization also has a signicant impact on recovery
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rates. My estimate of the coe¢ cient on the Distressed Exchange suggests that, on
average, a distressed exchange has a 25% higher recovery rate than formal Chapter
11 bankruptcy, controlling for other e¤ects.23
Recovery rates are positively associated with macroeconomic conditions at de-
fault, consistent with the economic-downturn e¤ect documented in previous litera-
ture. Controlling for macroeconomic conditions at the inception of a loan, a one-
standard-deviation improvement in any of several standard macroeconomic perfor-
mance variables at default is associated with an estimated increase in the expected
rm recovery rate of about 7% of the total debt principal. Moreover, a rms debt-to-
assets ratio one quarter before default is negatively associated with recovery rates,
even after controlling for the bank-debt share in total debt. Finally, I found no
signicant relationship between recovery rates and total book assets.
Recovery rates are all between 0 and 1, except for a few rms whose recovery
rates are slightly greater than 1. A considerable number of rm-wide recoveries
are clustered near 0 and 1. This raises a concern that OLS regressions may yield
inconsistent estimates because the reported recovery rates are censored between 0 and
1. To address this concern, I also estimate a two-sided Tobit regression, with upper
and lower boundaries set to 1 and 0, respectively.24 Panel B of Table 4 presents the
Tobit regression results, which resemble the OLS results in Panel A. For conciseness,
I present only OLS estimates for the rest of the paper.
C Counter-cyclicality of covenant strictness
Before directly testing the association between recovery rates and covenant strictness,
I examine the counter-cyclicality of loan covenant strictness (Hypothesis 2). Because
the covenant-intensity index is an integer between 0 and 6, a Poisson regression model
(in addition to an OLS regression) is used to examine the determinants of loan
23One may be concerned that the choice of an out-of-court distressed exchange or an in-court
bankruptcy is endogenous. My estimates show that, after excluding distressed exchange cases, the
estimated coe¢ cients of other variables remain largely unchanged.
24Tobit regression handles linear models with observations of the dependent variable, truncated
or censored above and/or below certain values.
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covenant strictness. Moreover, likely determinants of the inclusion of each covenant
in a loan contract are investigated by estimating a probit model.
Panel A of Table 5 reports estimates of OLS regression models relating the
covenant-intensity index to macroeconomic conditions, of the form
CovenantIntensityit = + 1 ln (TotalBookAssetsit) (3)
+2Debt-to-Assetsit + 3BankShareit
+4SyndicatedLoanit + 5 ln (LoanSze)it
+6 (BankLiabilities=Assets)it
+7MacroFactorst + "it.
In estimating these models, I control for rm size (logarithm of total book assets),
rm debt-to-assets ratio, the bank-debt share in total debt, loan size, the ratio of
bank liabilities to total assets, and whether the loan is syndicated. These variables
are measured at the origination of the bank loan contract.
The results support Hypothesis 2. For all four di¤erent measures of macroeco-
nomic conditions, the regressions reveal signicant counter-cyclicality of the covenant-
intensity index, consistent with the results of Bradley and Roberts (2004). I also
document that covenant strictness is signicantly and positively associated with a
rms leverage and bank-debt share of total debt. In addition, the results show a
positive and statistically signicant association between the covenant-intensity in-
dex and the lead banks ratio of total liabilities to total assets, suggesting that the
nancial exibility of lenders plays a role in determining loan contract strictness.
Finally, my results indicate that syndicated loans tend to be more restrictive than
single-lender loans.
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of Poisson regressions, which are consistent
with the results of the OLS regressions.
The covenant-intensity index puts equal weights on all six indicators, an arbitrary
choice. To check the robustness of the results to weighting the indicators, I modify
the covenant-intensity index by counting the three sweep covenants only once (so
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that the index ranges from 0 to 4), and by including in the count all categories of
nancial-ratio covenants. The corresponding regression results (not reported here
for brevity) are similar to those in Table 5.
Turning to the likelihood of a particular covenant being included in a debt con-
tract, I estimate a separate probit model for each of the six types of loan covenants.
The dependent variable is an indicator that is set to be 1 if the covenant is included
in the rms loan contract and 0 otherwise. The independent variables include the
logarithm of total book assets, rm debt-to-assets ratio, bank-debt share in total debt
at default, loan size, the ratio of bank liabilities to total assets, whether the loan is
syndicated, and the trailing-quarter U.S. GDP growth rate at loan origination. The
results are presented in Table 6. Other proxies for macroeconomic conditions lead
to similar estimates.
The data suggest that macroeconomic conditions are negatively and statistically
signicantly associated with the likelihood of inclusion of each of the six covenants.
That is, the worse are macroeconomic conditions at loan origination, the more likely
is a covenant to be included, supportive of Hypothesis 2. Moreover, the lead banks
ratio of liabilities to assets is positively associated with the probability of covenant
inclusion, suggesting again the signicant impact of lenders nancial exibility on
contractual restrictions. For example, a one-standard-deviation shift in the lenders
ratio of liabilities to assets is associated with an estimated increase of 12% in the
probability of inclusion of a debt issuance covenant.
D Impacts of covenant strictness and the covenant-setting
channel
I have shown evidence that recovery rates are negatively associated with lagged
macroeconomic conditions (Hypothesis 3), and that loan covenant strictness is counter-
cyclical (Hypothesis 2). A critical question is whether lagged systematic variation in
recovery rates is induced mainly through covenant setting. This subsection addresses
this question directly by testing Hypotheses 1 and 4. Five di¤erent specications are
examined: a base-case regression without lagged macroeconomic variables, and four
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other regressions that include di¤erent measures of macroeconomic conditions at loan
origination. These regressions take the form
RecoveryRateit = + 1 ln (TotalBookAssetsit) (4)
+2Debt-to-Assetsi(t 1) + 3BankShareit
+4HHI it + 5DistressedExchangeit
+6CovenantIndexi + 7MacroFactort + "it,
and
RecoveryRateit = + 1 ln (TotalBookAssetsit) (5)
+2Debt-to-Assetsi(t 1) + 3BankShareit
+4HHI it + 5DistressedExchangeit
+6CovenantIndexi + 7MacroFactort
+8MacroFactor + "it.
Panel A of Table 7 presents the OLS regression results. The results of the base-
case regression in Column 1 show that covenant strictness is positively and statisti-
cally signicantly related to recovery rates, consistent with Hypothesis 1. The results
are robust to the choice of the measure of macroeconomic conditions at default. As
to the magnitude of the impact, a one-unit increase in the covenant-intensity index is
associated with an estimated increase of 4% in recovery of total debt principal, after
controlling for macroeconomic conditions at default and for rm characteristics.
I test Hypothesis 4 by examining the impact of the covenant-intensity index on the
dependence of recovery rates on lagged macroeconomic conditions. Columns 2 to 4
present regression results with both the covenant-intensity index and macroeconomic
conditions at loan origination as independent variables. The coe¢ cients on the lagged
macroeconomic variables, which are signicant when the covenant-intensity index is
not included (Table 4), are now statistically insignicant. This e¤ect is robust to
di¤erent measures of macroeconomic conditions. This empirical evidence supports
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Hypothesis 4.
After controlling for the covenant-intensity index, recovery rates are still posi-
tively and statistically signicantly related to the bank-debt share, bank-debt con-
centration, indicator for distressed exchange, and macroeconomic conditions at de-
fault. These results suggest that these four macroeconomic factors may inuence
default recoveries above and beyond their e¤ects on covenant strictness. In other
words, while loan covenants play a central role in determining a rms value at
default, macroeconomic conditions may a¤ect recovery rates during the process of
renegotiation and reorganization after default.
To check the robustness of these ndings, I use an alternative measure of a rms
nancial soundness, the distance to default. Since the construction of distance to
default requires a time series of stock prices, the sample for these regressions is
smaller. The regression results, presented in Panel B of Table 7, are similar to the
previous results.
V Robustness
This section contains some additional checks on the robustness of my results.
A Alternative interpretations
I have controlled for macroeconomic conditions at default when investigating the
impacts of lagged macroeconomic conditions on subsequent default recoveries. One
may be concerned that macroeconomic conditions are negatively correlated over a
business cycle. Maybe the opposite impacts on recovery of the macroeconomic con-
ditions at loan origination and at default result from this negative autocorrelation.
To address this, I estimate Equation (5) for two di¤erent samples: (1) rms with at
least 1 year between loan origination and default, and (2) rms with at least 2 years
between loan origination and default. Panels A and B of Table 8 present the results,
which resemble those of Table 7. This robustness to di¤erent time horizons suggests
that the measured role of macroeconomic conditions is unlikely to be driven by the
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negative autocorrelation of macroeconomic conditions.
B Robustness to measurement and model specication
The measure of covenant strictness that I have used is merely the sum of six equally-
weighted indicator variables. To check the robustness of my estimates, I try two
other measures of covenant strictness, both of which support my results.
The rst alternative measure counts sweep covenants only once. Under this al-
ternative, the strictness index is the sum of four indicator variables, one each for
collateral, dividend restrictions, more than three nancial-ratio covenants, and at
least one sweep covenant. The estimates of the determinants of default recovery
rates are shown in Panel C of Table 8, and are similar to those for the original
measure of covenant strictness, shown in Panel A of Table 7.
The second alternative measure is the total number of nancial-ratio covenants
in the binding loan contract. The corresponding estimates of the determinants of
default recovery rates are in Panel D of Table 8. The estimates are, again, consistent
with those based on the original covenant-intensity index.
Another potential concern is the role of multiple coexisting credit agreements.
As I have explained, the e¤ectively binding contract is not necessarily the most
restrictive one. One way to deal with this concern is to analyze rms with only one
bank-debt contract at default. Fortunately, 364 of the 422 rms in the nal sample
have only one bank-debt contract at default. Panel E of Table 8 shows estimates
of the regression of recovery rates on potential explanatory variables for rms with
only one credit agreement. The results are similar to those for the entire sample of
422 rms.
Another way to deal with this concern is to include in the regression an indicator
that is 1 if there is only one credit agreement at default and 0 otherwise. The
coe¢ cient on this indicator is expected to be statistically insignicant if the most
restrictive contract is a valid proxy. Panel F of Table 8 shows that the changes of
the coe¢ cient estimates caused by including the dummy variable are negligible, and
shows that the coe¢ cient on this dummy variable is statistically indistinguishable
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from zero.
With a couple of exceptions, the distribution of recovery rates in the nal sample
is between 0 and 1, with clusters near 0 and 1. This raises a concern about whether
the coe¢ cient estimates of the linear regressions are unbiased. In order to address
this question, I analyzed the relationship between recovery rates and the suggested
determinants using two-sided Tobit regressions. The results are virtually unchanged.
For conciseness, the results are not reported here.
C Endogeneity
The main question investigated in this paper is the impact of covenant strictness on
subsequent default recovery rates. One may argue that the default recovery predicted
at origination of a loan may play a role in determining covenants. For instance, a bank
may demand stricter covenants if the borrowing rm has less tangible assets, which
typically leads to a lower post-default rm value and lower expected recovery rates.
Ideally, this challenge to the identication of the covenant e¤ect on recovery rates
can be treated by an instrumental variable that is correlated with covenant strictness
and that is not otherwise correlated with recovery rates. With no suitably e¤ective
instrumental variable, rst I show instead the direction and the potential magnitude
of the e¤ect of endogeneity on my estimates, and then I use macroeconomic conditions
at origination as an imperfect instrumental variable to illustrate the analysis.
First, if the expected default at origination a¤ects covenants in the postulated
way, then my OLS estimates understate the true covenant e¤ect on default recovery
rates. Appendix B considers a simple model of endogeneity captured by a latent
variable, and formally deduces this conclusion. Based on this model, my regression
results suggest that if a one-standard-deviation decrease in expected recovery at
origination induces a one-standard-deviation increase in the covenant-intensity index,
then the true impact of covenant strictness on recovery rates is estimated to be
200% higher than the reported OLS estimates. Other potential degrees of bias are
illustrated in Appendix B. This conclusion is consistent across various measures of
macroeconomic conditions.
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To test the consistency of the analysis with the data, I conduct two-stage least
square (2SLS) regressions using macroeconomic conditions at loan as a imperfect
instrumental variable. The rst stage involves regressing covenant strictness on the
instrument and controls. The second stage involves regressing recovery rates on
the estimated covenant strictness and control variables, including macroeconomic
conditions at default. The estimates, presented in Panel G of Table 8, are largely
unchanged compared with those in Table 7, except that the e¤ect of covenant strict-
ness on recovery rates is almost twice as strong. The stronger covenant e¤ect in the
2SLS is consistent with the analysis that the reverse causality weakens our estimates.
Moreover, based on the curves in Figure 3, the estimates suggest that the strength of
the reverse causality, , is about 1
3
, meaning that a one-standard-deviation incease
in expected recovery on average includes a one-third-standard-deviation decrease in
covenant strictness ex ante.
VI Conclusion
I investigated the e¤ect of bank loan covenants on default recovery rates by examin-
ing a comprehensive dataset of rm-wide recovery rates for U.S. rms from 1988 to
2007. The main nding is that stricter covenants are strongly associated with higher
recovery rates, suggesting that loan covenants may be e¤ective in protecting credi-
tors in the event of default. Moreover, as bank-loan standards are counter-cyclical,
default recovery rates depend negatively on lagged macroeconomic performance. In
particular, the evidence suggests that in good times covenants tend to be loose, and
that recovery rates are likely to be low if and when the rm later defaults. In contrast,
in bad times covenants are usually strict and help limit the losses of creditors in the
event of default. The benets of bank monitoring arising from the lagged-covenant
e¤ect could be substantial. Although I have not established the degree of causality,
my estimates of the likely e¤ects of endogeneity suggest signicant causality.
These results highlight that covenants, often considered a measure of creditor
control outside of bankruptcy, also signicantly inuence the outcome of bankruptcy.
An interesting question that remains open for debate is: At what exact moment do
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creditors exercise control?25 Empirical evidence on this question would shed light on
the governance role of large creditors.
Appendix A. Potential sample-selection bias
As noted previously, my nal sample contains 422 default events, a severe reduction
from the 722 rms in the URD. Moreover, there are at least 1,300 defaults during
the same period among all rms covered by Moodys Default Risk Service (DRS),
almost twice as many as the URD sample. This section examines the potential for
sample-selection bias by comparing the three sets of rms.
The DRS dataset contains credit histories of about 10,000 corporate and sovereign
entities and over 200,000 individual debt securities, going back to 1970. The DRS
data include rating histories, default histories, as well as descriptive data on issuers
and debt instruments. The version of the dataset that I use includes defaults from
February 1970 to June 2006, covering 1543 default events for 1409 distinct rms
during this period. Default events are categorized into 20 types, such as missed
interest or principal payment, Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and distressed exchange.
Figure 1 presents a longitudinal view of the default events in my nal sample, the
URD sample, and the DRS dataset. The plots in Panel A illustrate the distribution
of defaulted rms in the three samples by year, over the period from 1987 to 2006.
The DRS data show two peak periods for default events, around 1990 and 2001. The
timing of default events for the URD sample, shown in the second graph in Panel A,
resembles this pattern. The nal sample does not show these peak default periods.
The defaults in the URD dataset seem to well represent the defaults in the DRS
dataset, while the defaults in the nal sample are more concentrated in the period
after 1994.
Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of rms in the nal sample by
default type and by the date of loan origination. The last graph in Panel B of
Figure 1 shows the distribution across rms of the time between the last bank loan
25See Roberts and Su (2009c) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on nancial con-
tracting.
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origination and default. The median time lag is 6 quarters, although a few rms
have lags of up to 7 or 8 years.
Panel A of Figure 2 plots the ratio of the numbers of rms in the nal sample
and the URD sample to the number of DRS rms, by year of default. There are
noticeable upward jumps in this ratio around the recessions of 1989-1990 and 2001-
2002, indicating that the URD sample focuses more on rms that defaulted during
credit-market turmoils.
I also compare the URD and DRS datasets in terms of form of default resolution.
Panels A, B and C of Table 2 show that:
 Chapter 11 bankruptcies and missed interest payments account for most of
the default events (89.4% for the nal sample, 85.7% for URD, and 79.6% for
DRS).
 Most bankrupt rms had their reorganization plans conrmed and emerged
from Chapter 11 (76.4% for the nal sample, 72.6% for URD, and 65.7% for
DRS).
 Acquired and liquidated rms total 25 of the 422 URD rms in my nal sample.
Of the remaining 397 rms, all emerged from default, and their operations
continued.
Panel D of Table 2 categorizes rms by SIC code. Industry classications are
based on the SIC manual from the U.S. Department of Labor website.26 In order
to visualize the comparison, Panel B of Figure 2 plots the number of rms in the
nal sample and the URD as fractions of the number of DRS rms in each industry
division. For most industries, the distribution of rms across industries is at, as
the fraction ranges from 60% to 100% for the URD and from 30% to 50% for the
nal sample. The nal sample does not contain rms in three industry groups:
26Specically, the divisions are as follows. Division A: Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; Divi-
sion B: Mining; Division C: Construction; Division D: Manufacturing; Division E: Transportation,
Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services; Division F: Wholesale Trade; Division G: Re-
tail Trade; Division H: Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Division I: Services; Division J: Public
Administration. For details, see their website at http://www.osha.gov/ pls/imis/sic_manual.html.
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Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; and Public
Administration. This suggests that, except for the exclusion of rms in these highly
regulated industries, the URD sample and my nal sample exhibit no bias on industry
groups.
Appendix B. Covenant endogeneity
In order to address the endogeneity problem described in Section V, consider the
model:
yi = a+ bxi + "i, (B1)
and
xi = + yi + zi + i, (B2)
where i denotes rm i, yi is the default recovery rate, xi is a covenant-intensity index,
zi are some independent variables that a¤ect covenant strictness but are uncorrelated
with recovery rates, and "i and i are error terms satisfying
E ("izj) = E
 
"ij

= E
 
zij

= E ("i) = E (i) = 0,
for all i and j. Moreover, we assume that each of the three series, fzig, f"ig, and
fig is independent and identically distributed with nitie fourth moments.
Denote x, y, and " the sample averages of x, y, and ", respectively. Then the
OLS estimate of b from (B1) is
b^ =
nX
i=1
(xi   x) (yi   y)
nX
i=1
(xi   x)2
= b+
nX
i=1
(xi   x) ("i   ")
nX
i=1
(xi   x)2
. (B3)
Moreover, plugging (B1) into (B2) and re-arranging terms, we get
(1  b)xi = + a + "i + zi + i. (B4)
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It then follows from the independence assumption that the series fxi"jg and fxixjg
are both independent with nite variances. From the weak law of large numbers,27
we get
1
n  1
nX
i=1
(xi   x) ("i   ") p! E (xi"i) = x" as n!1,
where x" denotes the covariance between xi and "i, and
1
n  1
nX
i=1
(xi   x)2 p! 2x as n!1,
where 2x is the variance of xi. The continuous mapping theorem
28 implies
nX
i=1
(xi   x) ("i   ")
nX
i=1
(xi   x)2
p! x"
2x
as n!1. (B5)
Plugging (B5) into (B3), we get
b^  b

p! x"
2x
as n!1. (B6)
Multiplying both sides of (B4) by "i and taking expectations, we get
x" =

1  b
2
". (B7)
Combining (B6) and (B7), we get

b^  b

p! 
1  b
2"
2x
as n!1. (B8)
The endogeneity hypothesis is that low expected recovery rates lead to stricter
27For a detailed discussion of the weak law of large numbers, see Durrett (2005) (page 35).
28For an application of the continuous mapping theorem to convergence in probability to a
constant, see Billingsley (1968) (page 31, Corollary 2).
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covenants, implying a negative coe¢ cient . It follows from (B8) that for large n,
the OLS estimate b^ understates the true impact of covenant strictness on recovery
rates. Given that we have estimated statistically signicant impacts of the covenant-
intensity index on default recovery rates based on the OLS model (B1), the true
e¤ect of stricter covenants on recovery rates should also be statistically signicant,
and even greater.
To show quantitatively how much the endogeneity problem may a¤ect the mag-
nitude of my estimates, I approximate b^ in the sense of convergence in probability:

b^  b

' 
1  b
2"
2x
. (B9)
We approximate the population variance of "i, 2", by our sample estimate ^
2
" =
1
n 1
nX
i=1
e2i , where ei = (yi   y)  b^ (xi   x), and the population variance of xi, 2x, by
the sample estimate, 1
n 1
nX
i=1
(xi   x)2. Now we have from (B9)
b^ ' b+ 
1  b
^2"
^2x
. (B10)
Based on my OLS estimates from Table 7 with macroeconomic conditions mea-
sured by GDP growth, we have ^2" = 0:0565, ^
2
x = 2:2992, and b^ = 0:0398. For a
given , we can solve from (B10) an approximation of b. The relation between the
approximation of b and  is shown in the rst panel of Figure 3. The graph suggests
that if a one-standard-deviation decrease in the expected recovery rate alone induces,
through the precautionary motives of the bank at the time of the loan negotiation, a
one-standard-deviation increase in the covenant-intensity index, then the true impact
of covenant strictness on recovery rates will be 200% higher than the OLS estimates.
This e¤ect is consistent across the four di¤erent measures of macroeconomic con-
ditions, as shown in Figure 3.
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Table 2: Comparison of DRS and URD
This table compares Moodys Default Risk Service (DRS) database, the entire Ultimate Recovery Database (URD),
and the URD rms in my nal sample. The DRS database covers default events from 1970 to 2006, while the
URD covers defaults from 1987 to 2007. Panel A presents the distribution of Total Book Assets, Panel B shows the
distribution of rms by default type, Panel C presents the distribution of rms by resolution type, and nally Panel
D shows the distribution of rms by indutry group.
DRS URD Full URD Final
(70-06) (87-06) All Public All Public
Panel A. Summary Statistics by Total Book Assets ($ millions)
Mean 1529.9 1466.0 1517.3 1623.8 1296.7 1374.9
Standard Deviation 6872.8 6535.2 6241.4 6592.6 4306.1 4553.8
Minimum 0.2 0.2 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
25-Percentile 151.8 168.9 179.9 178.4 185.9 188.7
Median 366.9 398.1 387.3 400.2 417.2 438.8
75-Percentile 1064.1 1106.8 964.6 1007.7 920.9 984.7
Maximum 103803 103803 103803 103803 71704 71704
Panel B. Summary Statistics by Default Type (%)
Missed interest payment 48.6 50.7 35.0 35.2 37.0 36.2
Chapter 11 25.7 24.7 19.4 19.7 21.1 21.2
Distressed exchange 9.7 9.2 4.9 4.9 4.3 4.0
Grace period default 2.9 3.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5
Suspension of payments 2.3 2.7 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.5
Missed principal and 2.2 2.4 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.3
interest payments
Prepackaged Chapter 11 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.2 0.8
Others 6.5 4.8 25.0 25.7 22.5 23.6
Not in Moodys 0.1 0.0 11.5 10.6 12.3 12.9
Panel C. Summary Statistics by Resolution Type (%)
Reorganization plan conrmed 27.3 29.3 30.6 32.5 36.3 37.3
Emerged from Chapter 11 15.7 16.6 13.0 11.7 9.5 8.6
Distressed exchange 9.7 9.2 4.9 4.3 3.6 2.7
Liquidated 6.0 6.5 3.4 3.8 2.8 2.9
Acquired 4.3 4.9 2.8 2.4 3.1 2.4
Made interest payment 3.6 3.9 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5
Emerged from bankruptcy 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 3.8 3.5
Others 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
N/A 30.5 26.4 30.6 31.3 28.2 29.2
Not in Moodys 0.1 0.0 11.5 10.6 12.3 12.9
Panel D. Summary Statistics by Industry (%)
A: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0
B: Mining 3.4 3.1 6.1 5.6 6.4 5.9
C: Construction 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.3
D: Manufacturing 24.0 24.6 34.4 35.9 37.4 38.3
E: Transportation, Communications, 13.7 14.3 18.9 19.5 17.8 18.2
Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services
F: Wholesale Trade 2.5 2.5 4.0 3.5 2.8 2.9
G: Retail Trade 8.1 8.6 14.6 13.8 13.3 12.6
H: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 5.6 5.8 3.1 2.9 3.6 2.9
I: Services 8.0 8.8 16.9 17.0 17.3 17.7
J: Public Administration 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
N/A 32.5 30.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Number of rms (all panels) 1543 1319 741 630 422 373
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Figure 3. How does endogeneity a¤ect my estimates?
This gure illustrates the relation between bA, which is an approximation of the
true covenant e¤ect b, and the coe¢ cient , which is the assumed impact of expect
recovery rates on covenant strictness.
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